Solving the Somali Jigsaw

Last month, 52 heads of state or government met for the London Conference on Somalia. It is clear that there is an increased appetite for resolving Somali’s difficulties. With suggestions that Somalia is about to go through a process of Balkanisation, what is the true extent of the fragmentation of this troubled nation? 

Nationalism to localism

Somalia is a country with one language, ethnicity, religion and culture. On paper, its social fabric is one that most African countries can only dream of. The context of Somalia’s current political predicament therefore makes for curious reading. Following the collapse of British and Italian colonialism, the two colonies unified in a rush of nationalistic fervour. And they would have been followed by the Somali’s of Djibouti had the French not pressed against it. In the early days of Somalia, the ideal of ‘Somali Weyn’ (Greater Somalia) was a unanimously popular political ambition. Somalis saw the division of the Somali peoples over four states (Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) as unacceptable. This sentiment was so strong it erupted into war against Ethiopia in 1977 – even spurning its relationship with the Soviet Union to pursue its vision of a Greater Somalia.

Today that vision still resonates. In 2006, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys announced, “We (the Union of Islamic Courts) will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia”. Even amongst separatist Somalilanders the thought of the Somali’s in the Ogaden being oppressed by the Ethiopian state leaves a sour taste in their mouth. So what is the key to understanding the tension between the dreams for Somali’s to be united and the current rush towards mini-states? 

As well as the pan-Somali shared culture that allowed for the cultivation of President Barre’s nationalism, Somali history also has left an indelible mark on the behaviour of its people. The nomadic Somali man was often autonomous and was most definitely not accustomed to sitting at the bottom of a social order. The idea of being ruled is a notion difficult to normalise in Somali society. Historically men were consulted on decisions made by their relevant communities. The decision to go to war, to relocate and dispute resolution were all made by local council, chaired by the community, where people’s opinions were taken into account. During the Barre rule, power was used as a tool to exclude certain clans and shower patronage on clans of Barre’s choice, most of all his own Darod clan. The trauma of tyrannical rule and the failure of the Greater Somalia policies have both repressed Somali nationalism and whipped up suspicion of centralised power.

The genealogy of Balkanisation

The process of Balkanisation is as old as the collapse of the Barre regime at the beginning of the 1990’s. Somaliland led the charge with its declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991. Somaliland was a slightly different case to the rest of Somalia, with its separate colonial experience. It joined the rest of Somalia but quickly regretted its hasty union. Feeling marginalised and unrepresented, they were the first group to fight for independence and to this day Somaliland is the only sub-national grouping to have a full separatist agenda.

In their quest for independence, Somaliland avoided the pursuit of power following the collapse of the government in Mogadishu. Instead, developing an open and organic structure of state institutions determined by local stakeholders and arrived at by deliberation. The absence of strongmen and the scramble for power guaranteed that Somaliland became the most stable place in Somalia.

Other regions began to take note. Soon, regional governments were established in Puntland and Galmudug. Not wishing to separate entirely, they formed as federal bodies of Somalia. This was an organic bottom-up development set around the desire to create local order.

The success this model of stabilisation created was indisputably superior to the international attempts to institute order. Noticing this, the United States adopted their ‘dual track policy’ in 2010 to support and encourage local bottom-up stabilisation efforts, as well as supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This led to an explosion of sub-national entities, some of which were undoubtedly opportunistically established in a scramble for international patronage. This process also led to many critics referring to the process as the Balkanisation of Somalia. Commenting on the Balkanisation process, Mary Harper, author of Getting Somalia Wrong? stated that: “There has been explosion of mini-states in Somalia, some, perhaps not coincidentally, established just ahead of the London Conference, maybe because they want a share of the new money.”

Wherever the international community puts money in Somalia there will be a scramble to seize it – by illegitimate as well as legitimate means. It is the job of the international community to distinguish between the latter and former.

Somaliland vs a united federalised Somalia

The ‘dual track policy’ pursued by the United States post-2010 ruffled feathers among Somali nationalists. These nationalists feared that overt support for regional political bodies could lead to the breakup of Somalia and rejected the new localism. The derailment of the TFG’s authority was also a concern. Critics of the ‘dual track policy’ see the localism policy as a Pandora’s Box. TFG ex-minister Abdinur Mohamad claimed that “the mushrooming of regional administrations and the sidelining of the central administration by the international community are clear threats to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Yet the federalist authorities have at their heart of their agenda the restoration of Somalia’s national government, a notion reinforced by public support.

It is still only Somaliland that wishes to break with Somalia. All other administrations are committed to a federalism that affords them a degree of local control to mitigate the potential for an overbearing central power and gives them the authority customary to the Somali man in his culture. The hyperbolic claims that Somalia is to fade into a collection of mutually hostile city-states drawn along clan lines is difficult to substantiate when put up against the public opinion and the policy of the federalist zones.

Following the London Conference on Somalia, the consultations with the Somali community and the pressure put on Somaliland to attend the negotiations (something it had never done), a sea change in international attitudes around the Balkanisation issue is becoming apparent.

It appears to be clear that the international community will not support projects to break up Somalia. Somaliland and the local administration trend that it set, may continue to be a force for good in the country, but it will not define the countries future geography. Time and time again at the London Conference on Somalia speakers reiterated their uncompromising support for a united Somalia. Hilary Clinton went as far as to say, “All those who have not yet joined the effort to unify Somalia have a choice to make. They can support this movement and join their fellow Somali’s in moving past the divisions and struggles for power… or they can be left behind”. This sentiment was supported by similar comments by Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davotoglu and British PM David Cameron, all of whom stated that they see national political reconciliation to be essential to the peace process.

Saving Somaliland

The big loser here is Somaliland, with the new international fervour for a unified Somalia effectively putting Somaliland’s dreams of independence to bed. It appears the mode of regional governance Somaliland adopted from 1991 that has, by example, set the rest of Somalia on the track to recovery is to become its prison. For Somalis outside Somaliland the commitment of extra support to re-establish the state and more regional aid is a fantastic settlement. On the other hand Somaliland, for whom their raison d’être is acquirement of international recognition of their independence, the conference was a difficult one.

Taking into account the international insistence on Somalia remaining unified, the big question that arises is what to do about the Somaliland-Somalia disconnect? The international community wants to bring Somaliland and its experience of political success and stability to the negotiation table, it wishes to normalise relations between the north and south. So far, it seems that the international attitude to the Somaliland rejection of involvement in Somalia is not terribly accommodating. Due to the sensitivity of such relations, such an approach is not good enough. The civil war between Somalia and what is now Somaliland saw 94% of Hargeisa (Somaliland’s capital) destroyed by government planes and an estimated 100,000 of its people killed. The memory of the conflict still evokes upset in the north-west. The “divisions and struggles for power” Secretary Clinton discussed, are admittedly evident across Somalia (including Somaliland) and these must be overcome.

Time may be against Somaliland. If the rest of the country stabilises, the chance of the international community recognising the de facto state decreases. Today, the once total unity in Somaliland around its independence project is subject to some internal dissent. Somaliland itself has become subject to a secessionist movement. The Sool-Sanag-Cayn group, run by a minority clan in Somaliland are vying to remain part of Somalia. The group claim that Somaliland have marginalised them and feel that they would fare better as part of Somalia alongside a bigger proportion of their clansman. Somaliland is unlikely to survive these tensions on its claim to self-determination. So what will the settlement around national reconciliation be and how do we prevent an Eritrea-Ethiopia scenario occurring in the future?

In the right circumstances Somaliland may benefit from involvement in the wider Somali peace process. The commitment in the final communiqué to support dialogue around TFG-Somaliland relations is an encouraging outcome of the conference. The international community must also accept that for Somaliland, having relations with the TFG at all is an affront to many of its people. Many Somalilanders will only participate in the Somali peace process if there is a South Sudan-styled political process, towards an eventual Mogadishu-sanctioned referendum on independence. This is something Somalis and the international community wish to avoid. The international community and Somali’s of the South must therefore court Somaliland and break down the barriers of distrust if they wish to tackle the separatist sentiment. The Balkanisation of Somalia is an exaggerated threat to the nation, but the Somaliland relationship and the threat of national partition it carries with it is the key risk to long-term peace and stability, and must therefore be handled with care.