Al Shabaab in Context
Al Shabaab is one of Africa’s most notorious militant organizations. The group has been accused of committing widespread human rights violations, including attacking aid workers and imposing harsh religious law in areas it controls. However, Al Shabaab didn’t evolve in a vacuum – it’s the product of decades of the repression of Somalis.
Since European colonial powers abandoned Somalia, the country has been wrestled over by international interests, and subjugated by warmongers. From the socialist-turned-U.S. lapdog Comrade Siad, to the warlords who carved up Somalia in the 1990s, ordinary Somalis have been denied the right to their own country. Al Shabaab was the inevitable result of a mix of neocolonialism and decades of poor governance. But to understand Al Shabaab, first we must understand the context that gave life to one of the most feared organizations in Africa.
Sowing the Seeds of Conflict
Throughout the colonial period, the overwhelming majority of Somalis were excluded from the European-imposed colonial state apparatuses. When the independent Somali Republic was finally born in 1960, it was a brittle mix of colonial bureaucracy and traditional clan structures – the latter being far more relevant to the daily lives of most Somalis. It took just nine years for the republic to collapse, and the self-proclaimed military dictator Siad Barre to seize power.
Dubbing himself Comrade Siad, the military ruler initially pledged allegiance to the USSR. The relationship didn’t last. In 1977, Barre invaded neighboring Ethiopia, which was also aligned with Moscow. When the USSR chose to side with Ethiopia, Comrade Siad turned to the United States, which promptly showered him in cash. During the rest of his reign, the socialist-turned-U.S. proxy began de-nationalizing sectors of the economy he had only just nationalized a decade earlier.
While enjoying U.S. support, Barre’s regime became one of Africa’s worst human rights abusers, and worked to eradicate all forms of political dissent. Like the colonial governments before him, Barre pitted himself against clan leaders, but made few efforts to include the masses in his government. By the 1980s, the economy had ground to a halt, and Barre embraced a structural adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund. While poverty on Somalia’s streets skyrocketed, Barre’s regime was insulated by U.S. aid, which reached as much as US$100 million some years. However, as the Cold War came to a close in the late 1980s, Washington increasingly lost interest in propping up their comrade in Somalia.
The Regime Collapses
When Barre was finally overthrown by a handful of resistance groups in 1991, there was little left of the country except a stagnant economy and the skeleton of a government hollowed out by years of top down rule. The loose coalition of anti-Barre fighters quickly turned their guns on each other. The country was soon divided up between rival warlords. By the new millennium, many of the warlords were jostling for support from the governments of neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia, which were both interested in expanding their influence in Somalia.
In 2004, a transitional government was established, but was widely viewed by Somalis as being dominated by just a handful of clans and international interests.
The ICU
Aside from the internationally recognized yet struggling government, the first major threat to the warlords came in the form of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which united 11 regional religious authorities into a single umbrella group. Like the warlords, the ICU also enjoyed international backing, but from Eritrea, rather than Kenya or Ethiopia.
In June 2006, the ICU seized control of Mogadishu. It threw out rival warlords, and unified the city for the first time in years. During that time, the ICU imposed something vaguely resembling stable governance over a large chunk of Somalia.
The ICU managed to hold together a disparate mix of peace seekers, religious leaders, clans, opportunists and religious fanatics. The organization has even been credited with curbing Mogadishu’s generally rampant crime. The ICU’s success can be partly attributed to relatively competent organization and its religious authority. While religious authority was held by the 11 courts, arguably the most well organized group within the ICU was its youth wing, the Shabaab.
The youth wing played a major role in ICU military operations, but they had an image problem, and had limited clout within the ICU. For years, the ICU was repeatedly forced to apologize for the youths’ brutality on the streets of Mogadishu. While the ICU generally tried to market itself as a broad mosque, the youth leadership were a new breed of radicals. Many of the wing’s leaders were first groomed for fighting under the Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI) militant group, which flourished in the first few years after the fall of Barre. AIAI was sponsored by Osama bin Laden, who provided arms and funding to the group during its heyday in the mid-1990s.
ICU Breaks Apart, Al Shabaab Emerges
Within months of unifying Mogadishu, the ICU found itself at war with the transitional government, which was supported by countries like Ethiopia. In December that year, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia to prop up the transitional government (TFG), fearing the Eritrean-backed ICU could pose a threat to Addis Ababa’s interests in Somalia. Backed with Ethiopian firepower, the TFG quickly overpowered the ICU.
After suffering a series of crushing defeats, the ICU broke apart into a handful of splinter groups. Moderates gravitated towards the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), which campaigned against the TFG from abroad until its dissolution in 2009. Hardliners flocked to militant splinter groups – the most prominent being the well-armed youth wing. While most of the ARS was eventually absorbed into the TFG, the youth vowed to continue to fight against the transitional government, which they viewed as little more than an Ethiopian puppet.
By the time Al Shabaab declared allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012, the ICU was long gone, and the youth had grown into one of the most powerful groups in Somalia – the modern Al Shabaab. At its height, Al Shabaab retook most of the south, including Mogadishu. However, the group has been steadily losing ground over the past three years. In mid 2011, the government and African Union mission (AMISOM) declared their first major victory against the splinter group, claiming they had retaken Mogadishu.
Al Shabaab Today
Since then, Al Shabaab has been pushed out of most of Somalia’s major cities. However, the organization still maintains a firm grip on much of Somalia’s countryside. It’s not without public support, either. Since the TFG gave way to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the internationally backed regime has struggled with financial woes, political scandals and rampant corruption. Mogadishu remains mired in crime and poverty, and the government is still regularly accused of being a puppet for international interests. Needless to say, the FGS provides Al Shabaab with plenty of propaganda fodder.
The group has also proven it’s still capable of stabbing at the heart of Somalia’s government. Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Mogadishu targeting Somali lawmakers, including suicide bombings.
In February, the organization mounted a surprise attack on the presidential residence, the Villa Somalia. After gaining entry by detonating a car bomb, the Al-Shabaab fighters stormed the residence. The attack was repelled and the president unharmed, but the incident reminded the world Al Shabaab is still a force to be reckoned with.
The organization is also flexing its muscle abroad, and has launched attacks in neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti. In September 2013, Al Shabaab hit headlines when it claimed responsibility for a massacre in a Nairobi mall. Among Al Shabaab’s less publicized international escapades are its attempts to secure ties with other militant groups in Africa, including Nigeria’s Boko Haram.
Meanwhile in Somalia, while it may not control as much of the country as it once did, Al Shabaab could still command as many as 6000 fighters. It’s also putting up a fierce resistance to an ongoing offensive by AMISOM and Somali government forces. Launched in late August, the offensive aims to break Al Shabaab’s grip on Somalia’s coastline, cutting the group off from access to the sea. The militant group also uses its coastal outposts to import weapons from abroad, while control of major ports offers lucrative trade revenue. Somalia’s charcoal trade in particular has been a cash cow for Al Shabaab.
Yet if the current offensive succeeds in pushing Al Shabaab inland, it could break the backbone of one of Africa’s most dangerous organizations. However, that could be the easy part of ending Al Shabaab’s legacy of violence. Without a credible, inclusive and competent government in Mogadishu, the conditions that made it so easy for Al Shabaab to emerge will persist.
teleSUR